Taliban control of lapis mines

Lapis lazuli – the vivid blue semi-precious stone once prized by pharaohs and artists – has long been abundant in Afghanistan’s rugged northeast. Badakhshan province, where the famed Sar-e-Sang mines are located, holds some of the world’s largest and highest-quality lapis deposits and has been mined for centuries. In recent years, however, this “blue treasure” became entwined with conflict and insurgency financing. The Taliban insurgency and local warlords vied for control of lapis mines, using the proceeds to fund their campaigns. Today, under Taliban rule, the group has firmly consolidated control over these mines. This report examines the current status of Taliban control and management of Afghanistan’s lapis lazuli mines, the Taliban’s role in the lapis trade, and the impacts on the local economy. It also explores how revenues from lapis mining contribute to Taliban finances, key stakeholders in this sector, global market implications, and the international community’s response to this situation.

Taliban Takeover and Control of Lapis Mines

The Taliban now fully control Afghanistan’s lapis lazuli mining areas, a position secured through years of insurgency gains and finalized after their August 2021 takeover of the country. The primary lapis deposits in Badakhshan’s Kuran-wa-Munjan district had already fallen under Taliban influence by mid-2018, as government forces and local militias lost their grip. Following the collapse of the Afghan republic in 2021, the Taliban moved swiftly to solidify their hold. Today, Taliban fighters and officials oversee the Sar-e-Sang mines and surrounding districts, eliminating rival armed groups. According to a United Nations Security Council report, the Taliban have now “assumed full control of exports of precious minerals” – including lapis lazuli – from Badakhshan. In practical terms, this means no lapis leaves the mines without Taliban approval or involvement. Armed checkpoints controlled by Taliban units regulate access to mining sites and transit routes, ensuring the movement of lapis is firmly under their authority.

Management of Lapis Mining under Taliban Rule

As Afghanistan’s de facto government, the Taliban have adopted a more organized (if opaque) approach to managing lapis mining. Under the previous government, all mineral resources were legally state property (requiring licenses), but in practice unregulated extraction was rampant. After taking power, the Taliban retained state ownership of Afghanistan’s mineral reserves and moved to centralize oversight of mining activities. In Badakhshan, local Taliban administrators – often reporting to the central Ministry of Mines and Petroleum – now supervise operations at the lapis mines. The Taliban have at times imposed stricter controls on extraction methods; for example, soon after their takeover they reportedly banned the use of dynamite for mining, forcing a return to manual techniques (a move aimed at curbing unsafe or illicit mining).

To capture more value from gemstones, the Taliban have also introduced local processing and trading initiatives. In 2022, authorities opened a new gemstone and minerals processing center in Badakhshan, alongside a provincial Chamber of Mines and Industries. The center is intended to cut and polish lapis and other gems locally, rather than see raw stones smuggled out. “Badakhshan is one of the richest provinces in the world… Badakhshan has ruby and lapis lazuli,” noted Rahimullah Samandar, executive director of the Chamber, at the center’s inauguration, expressing hope that the region’s resources will now be properly harnessed. Taliban officials present these steps as a good omen for the local economy, aiming to formalize the lapis supply chain under their rule. In essence, the Taliban manage the mines by combining tight security control (to prevent unauthorized extraction) with efforts to legalize and tax the mining and sale of lapis.

Taliban’s Role in the Lapis Trade

With physical control of the mines, the Taliban have become the gatekeepers of the lapis lazuli trade. During the insurgency years, lapis was often sneaked out of Badakhshan through illicit networks – typically overland into Pakistan’s frontier markets. Now the Taliban seek to channel these flows through themselves. They have effectively monopolized export pathways for lapis, coordinating with smugglers or traders who are willing to cooperate, and levying fees or “royalties” on each kilogram of stone. According to Taliban officials, this has curbed the rampant smuggling of the past. The Taliban’s acting mining minister, Shahabuddin Delawar, claimed that *“the sale of minerals has increased because of transparency and an end to smuggling.”* Indeed, the Taliban assert that by removing multiple insurgent checkpoints and bribe-taking officials, they have streamlined gemstone exports under a single authority – their own.

However, independent observers suggest that informal trade routes persist despite Taliban oversight. Old habits die hard in the gemstone market. Smugglers continue to truck lapis lazuli across the Pakistani border to the Peshawar gem bazaars, just as they did before, albeit now likely paying off Taliban-aligned officials instead of various militia. Small traders from countries like China have also been reported buying or quietly exporting Afghan gemstones in “small quantities”, taking advantage of the lack of international monitoring in Taliban-held Afghanistan. In short, the Taliban play a central role: all major lapis transactions involve them – whether through formal auctions, taxation of private miners, or tacit agreements with smugglers. The Taliban profit at each step, either by selling lapis directly, issuing mining permits to loyal businessmen, or extracting “taxes” at checkpoints. No rival power exists on the Afghan side to challenge their role in the lapis trade now, unlike in prior years when warlords and insurgents competed.

Impact on Local Communities and Economy

The turbulence surrounding lapis mining has had mixed effects on the local economy in Badakhshan. On one hand, mining activity provides jobs for miners, laborers, and traders in an otherwise remote, impoverished region. Under Taliban control, the security situation around the mines has arguably stabilized – open fighting over the mine sites has ceased for now, which could allow more consistent work for local miners. The new processing center also raises local hopes that value-added jobs (such as cutting and polishing stones) will emerge in the province, rather than all raw lapis being whisked away. Such developments could inject income into communities that host the mines.

On the other hand, years of unregulated extraction have severely depressed the value of lapis, undercutting long-term economic benefits. An investigative study found that lapis lazuli prices in Afghanistan have “reduced unprecedentedly” due to illegal over-mining. A kilogram of high-grade lapis that might have sold for around $500 in local markets a decade ago was fetching as little as $20 by the late 2010s. “Our business was good in the past but has declined to 10 percent of [what it was] in the past five years,” said Mohammad Ibrahim, head of the Kabul Jewelers Union, illustrating the collapse of the legitimate lapis trade. Essentially, a flood of illicit lapis oversupply drove prices to rock-bottom, which devastated many Afghan gem traders and artisans who could not compete with the cheap, untaxed stone. While local strongmen and the Taliban earned revenue, the average Badakhshani saw little trickle-down benefit from the gem wealth.

Communities near the mines have also suffered from the instability and corruption tied to lapis. In the mid-2010s, Badakhshan – once considered a relatively peaceful region – became destabilized as armed groups fought for mine profits. Schools, clinics, and agriculture in those districts languished while elites squabbled over lapis income. Environmental and safety standards were largely ignored; rudimentary mining techniques (and occasional use of explosives in the past) scarred the landscape and led to accidents. In one nearby province (Takhar), for example, a mining accident that killed five people prompted the Taliban to suspend some operations and reassert control – highlighting the unsafe conditions in informal mines.

Under the Taliban’s new management, locals hope for greater stability and perhaps infrastructure investment, but concerns remain that the wealth will continue to bypass ordinary people. Without robust mechanisms to ensure revenue-sharing or local reinvestment, Badakhshan’s villages may still see only marginal improvements. The Taliban’s focus appears to be extracting and selling lapis quickly for revenue, rather than sustainable community development. Thus, while the local economy now has more mining jobs and calm than during the fighting, it continues to be dominated by an extractive model that primarily enriches those in power.

Revenues from Lapis Mining and Taliban Finances

Lapis lazuli has become an important financial lifeline for the Taliban – both historically as insurgents and now as rulers. During the insurgency period, income from lapis helped fill the Taliban’s war chest. By 2015–2016, the Taliban were earning an estimated $20 million per year from illegal lapis mining in Badakhshan. This made lapis (and other lootable minerals) the Taliban’s second-largest revenue source after narcotics at the time. In fact, Afghan officials warned in 2016 that militant groups’ profits from lapis were fueling the war and could rival drug money. The designation of lapis as a de facto “conflict mineral” was largely due to its sizable contribution to insurgent finances.

Since the Taliban takeover, the scale of mining revenues captured by the Taliban has only grown. With no government opposition and all former local militias sidelined or co-opted, the Taliban now reap 100% of the official and illicit proceeds from lapis. One assessment by a UN member state found that mining of precious stones (like lapis) and gold in Badakhshan *“generated $464 million for the Taliban in 2020”* – a staggering sum that likely increased after 2021 given the Taliban’s complete control of exports. If accurate, this figure suggests that lapis mining (often combined with gold mining in the same region) is a hundreds-of-millions-of-dollars business for the Taliban. Even discounting uncertainties in estimates, it is clear that lapis contributes significantly to the Taliban’s income stream, alongside other minerals such as coal, marble, and lithium.

Taliban officials themselves highlight mining as a pillar of their budget. Shahabuddin Delawar, the Taliban’s Minister of Mines and Petroleum, recently stated that the government collected over $220 million in mining revenue in the last fiscal year. (This figure includes all minerals nationwide, but lapis lazuli is a notable component.) He also noted that the Taliban administration has signed over a hundred mining contracts and actively markets minerals to foreign buyers. While these claims are hard to verify independently, they underscore the Taliban’s reliance on selling natural resources. Every truckload of lapis that is taxed or sold contributes to financing the regime’s activities – from paying fighters’ salaries to funding government departments. In the absence of international aid (which dried up after the Taliban takeover), these mineral revenues help keep the Taliban government afloat. However, they also raise concerns that Afghanistan’s mineral wealth is being liquidated for short-term gain, possibly at the expense of long-term prosperity for its people.

Key Stakeholders in the Lapis Lazuli Sector

A number of key stakeholders are involved in or affected by the Taliban-controlled lapis mining enterprise:

Taliban Government and Local Authorities: The Taliban’s leadership and various commissions (especially the Ministry of Mines and local Taliban governors) are primary stakeholders. They set policies, issue mining rights or contracts, and deploy security forces to guard the mines. Taliban officials and commanders in Badakhshan have a direct hand in managing mine operations and collecting revenues. For example, the Taliban’s provincial administrators now oversee Sar-e-Sang and ensure that proceeds are remitted to Taliban accounts. The regime’s central treasury benefits from these funds, which bolster the Taliban’s overall budget.

Local Strongmen and Former Warlords: Before the Taliban took full control, local powerbrokers were deeply involved in the lapis trade. Figures like Commander Abdul Malik – a militia leader in Kuran-wa-Munjan – once ran mining sites and struck deals with the Taliban insurgents, effectively paying “protection money” to keep operating. Global Witness reported that Malik paid nearly $5 million to the Taliban over two years from his mining profits. Such warlords profited immensely, though many were eventually sidelined by the Taliban takeover. Some may have been incorporated into the Taliban structure or displaced. Nonetheless, local influencers continue to matter: even under Taliban rule, the cooperation of village elders, mine supervisors, or former militia members can help maintain stability at the mines. These actors often seek a cut of the proceeds or local employment guarantees.

Mine Workers and Local Communities: Hundreds of Afghan laborers and their families depend on lapis mining for livelihoods. These include miners who extract the stones by hand or with machinery, porters who haul loads, and artisans who do preliminary stone-cutting. The surrounding communities are stakeholders in that they bear the brunt of environmental and social impacts. They hope to gain jobs or community investment from the mines. However, historically they have seen minimal reward – for instance, during the smuggling boom, miners were paid low wages while profits flowed to armed groups. Going forward, community members have a stake in how responsibly and equitably the Taliban manage the resource.

Traders, Smugglers, and Middlemen: An extensive network of Afghan and foreign traders has long been involved in moving lapis lazuli from the remote mines to international markets. These include smugglers in Badakhshan and Nuristan who transport gems covertly, trucking them across the border into Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. One such smuggler described seeing “trucks full of these stones… cross at Torkham” on the Pakistan border, destined for Peshawar’s gem market. In Peshawar and other regional trading hubs (like Dubai), Afghan lapis is bought, mixed, or re-exported. Some traders operate with Taliban sanction now, effectively becoming the regime’s sales agents abroad. Others might try to evade Taliban oversight to maximize their own profits. Either way, these middlemen are critical players in converting raw lapis into cash and distributing the stone globally.

Foreign Buyers and the Global Gem Industry: End-buyers of lapis lazuli range from Chinese businesses (China has been a major importer of Afghan lapis in recent years) to international gem dealers, jewelry companies, and even Western hobbyist markets. Their demand drives the trade. For instance, Chinese dealers reportedly stockpiled thousands of tons of Afghan lapis in warehouses, taking advantage of cheap prices during the past decade. Worldwide, lapis is used in jewelry, ornamentation, and pigment, and Afghanistan is a primary source. Some foreign entities, including state-linked companies, have shown interest in investing directly in Afghan mining (China and Pakistan are often mentioned). At the same time, ethical concerns have made many Western jewelers cautious about sourcing Afghan lapis that might fund the Taliban. Thus, the global gem industry is both a stakeholder and a pressure point: their purchasing decisions affect the Taliban’s revenue, and their policies (e.g. avoiding conflict gems) can influence the trade.

International Organizations and Monitors: Various NGOs and international bodies keep a close eye on the lapis trade due to its conflict implications. Global Witness, a corruption-monitoring NGO, was instrumental in exposing how lapis funded armed groups and in lobbying for reform. The United Nations Monitoring Team for Afghanistan (under UNSC sanctions resolutions) tracks Taliban funding sources, including minerals, and reports those findings to member states. Organizations like these, as well as Western governments, are stakeholders insofar as they advocate policies (sanctions, due diligence guidelines, etc.) that impact how lapis is extracted and sold. Their work has led to greater awareness of Afghan lapis as a conflict resource and put pressure on authorities (previously the Afghan government, now Taliban and neighboring countries) to curb the illicit trade.

Global Market Implications

Afghanistan’s lapis lazuli has significant implications for the global gem and jewelry market. As one of the world’s only large sources of lapis (the stone is “almost unique to Afghanistan” in terms of quality and quantity), changes in Afghan supply directly impact global availability and prices. Over the last decade, the surge of illegally mined lapis flooding out of Badakhshan created a glut on the international market. With supply far outpacing demand, the price of lapis plummeted worldwide. Industry observers noted that Afghan lapis was being sold at “rock bottom” prices on the global market, undermining prices for even top-grade material. Local studies confirmed that a massive quantity – “thousands of tons” – of Afghan lapis was smuggled out in just a few years, leading to oversupply so severe that *“Afghanistan’s lapis lazuli even cannot afford the expenses of the warehouses in China.”* In other words, Chinese buyers amassed such a large stock that much of it sat unsold, and the market value of lapis declined sharply. This benefitted international wholesalers in the short term (they could acquire the stone cheaply), but it hurt Afghan producers and distorted the gem’s rarity value.

Under Taliban control, the supply dynamics might shift. If the Taliban choose to enforce output quotas or hold back stock to drive prices up, they could influence global prices (similar to how some countries manage high-value commodities). Conversely, the Taliban may opt to sell as much lapis as possible, as fast as possible, to generate revenue, which would continue the oversupply situation. So far, their actions – encouraging more mining and seeking new buyers – suggest a push for volume. Global buyers who are less sensitive to ethical concerns (for instance, markets in Asia or the Middle East) are likely to keep purchasing Afghan lapis, meaning the stone will remain abundant internationally.

Another implication is the growing ethical scrutiny of gemstones. After seeing how lapis sales bankrolled conflict, many in the jewelry industry and consumer base have started viewing Afghan lapis as a “conflict gem.” Unlike diamonds (which have the Kimberley Process), colored stones like lapis lack a widely adopted certification scheme to exclude conflict sources. Nonetheless, some responsible jewelers have self-imposed bans on Afghan lapis or require proof of origin. As one U.S. gem seller put it, “most if not all” Afghan lapis comes from an illegal trade that funds the Taliban, and there is realistically no way to assure a piece of lapis didn’t benefit armed groups. Consequently, demand in Western markets has dampened, with vendors pulling Afghan lapis from their catalogs to avoid indirectly financing the Taliban. This could, over time, affect global market routes – perhaps more Afghan lapis will flow to markets with fewer sourcing restrictions (such as China, Pakistan, or segments of the online mineral trade) and less to high-end Western jewelers concerned with transparency.

Finally, the international interest in Afghanistan’s broader mineral wealth (from copper to lithium) means lapis lazuli is part of a larger geopolitical resource picture. The Taliban have been courting foreign investment for mining, and any major deals or partnerships (say with Chinese state companies or Gulf investors) could formalize and increase production of lapis. That might integrate Afghan lapis more officially into global supply chains (with accompanying marketing as a legitimate Afghan export) – or, if sanctions remain, push the trade further into gray markets. In summary, global buyers will feel the effects of how the Taliban handle lapis: either through continued low prices and ample supply (if mining is unchecked), or potentially through price increases if the trade becomes more restricted or if ethical boycotts shrink the pool of willing purchasers.

International Community Response and Measures

The international community has grappled with how to respond to the Taliban’s control over lapis lazuli and its associated revenues. Since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021, most direct assistance and financial engagement with Kabul have been halted. Western governments froze about $9.5 billion of Afghanistan’s central bank assets and cut off development aid, aiming to deny the Taliban easy funds. While these actions were not targeted specifically at lapis, they form a backdrop of economic isolation that affects all Afghan exports. The Taliban regime remains internationally unrecognized due to its human rights abuses and hard-line policies, which also limits its ability to officially sell resources abroad. Major mining companies and gem buyers in Europe or North America, for instance, are generally unwilling to sign deals that would openly fund a sanctioned Taliban authority. This lack of legitimacy “hangs over” any large-scale exploitation of Afghan minerals, creating skepticism that mining wealth can be developed under current conditions.

Beyond general economic pressure, there have been more targeted measures and advocacy addressing the lapis trade. In 2016, after evidence mounted that lapis profits were bankrolling insurgents, the NGO Global Witness issued a landmark report urging that “the lapis which supplies much of the world market” be classified as a **“conflict mineral.”** This designation, akin to “blood diamonds,” was meant to discourage international buyers from purchasing Afghan lapis and to spur tighter controls. The Afghan government at the time (under President Ashraf Ghani) supported this push – officials even deployed security forces to Badakhshan in an effort to wrest the mines from Taliban and militia control. The idea was that if lapis received a conflict mineral label, it could be subject to monitoring and due diligence requirements in global trade. While there is no single global regime for colored gemstones, the advocacy did raise awareness. The U.S. and other donors pressured Afghan authorities to crack down on illegal mining, and Afghan leaders pledged reforms (though enforcement remained weak).

Since the Taliban came to power, external leverage over lapis mining has diminished. No foreign peacekeepers or government forces are on the ground to enforce mine closures. Instead, the United Nations Security Council’s sanctions monitoring team keeps highlighting the issue in its reports to maintain international focus. For example, a 2023 UN report noted the Taliban’s full control of lapis mines and flagged that mining had generated significant revenue for the group. These reports inform the Security Council and member states’ sanction decisions. However, the UN has not imposed an explicit ban on Afghanistan’s mineral exports. China, Pakistan, and other neighboring countries have shown interest in Afghan resources and are unlikely to support any international embargo on gemstones. That said, some countries have taken unilateral steps: for instance, the United States can block or penalize transactions that involve Taliban-sanctioned individuals, which could indirectly deter companies from dealing in Afghan-origin lapis if it obviously enriches the Taliban.

Another facet of the international response is the promotion of transparent supply chains and ethical sourcing. Organizations and industry groups are working on traceability initiatives for gems. Jewelers in Europe and America, under guidance from bodies like the Responsible Jewellery Council, have been advised to conduct due diligence to avoid stones linked to conflict or sanctions. In practice, this often means avoiding buying lapis directly from Afghanistan unless it’s certifiably old stock or mined in a government-controlled period. Some gemstone forums and shows (such as the annual Tucson Gem Show) have seen debate about vendors selling Afghan lapis under the Taliban – reflecting a form of market self-regulation driven by consumer awareness. These measures, while voluntary, are part of the broader international effort to deny the Taliban the full benefit of the lapis trade without harming Afghan civilians. The challenge is balancing pressure on the Taliban with the economic needs of ordinary Afghans who depend on mining.

In summary, the international community’s approach has included: diplomatic non-recognition of the Taliban regime (limiting official mineral trade), financial sanctions that constrain the Taliban’s access to profits, calls to treat lapis as a conflict mineral to stigmatize its trade, and ongoing monitoring and reporting on the situation. However, enforcement of restrictions relies heavily on neighboring countries’ cooperation and market participants’ conscience. To date, Pakistan’s border markets remain a key gap – tons of lapis still make it through to Peshawar – and there is no global ban on Afghan lapis akin to the Kimberley Process for diamonds. Thus, international measures have only partially addressed the issue. The Taliban still find ways to convert lapis into revenue, though likely at lower values and with more difficulty than if they had a recognized government that could openly export the stone.

Conclusion

Afghanistan’s lapis lazuli mines illustrate the country’s broader dilemma of vast natural wealth trapped in a cycle of conflict and exploitation. Now firmly under Taliban control, these mines are being managed as a strategic asset to bankroll the regime. The Taliban have tightened their grip on extraction and trade, turning lapis into a significant source of income amid international sanctions and economic isolation. In Badakhshan, the guns have quieted, but the local populace has yet to see a mining bonanza improve their lives – instead, they witnessed years of plunder that crashed lapis prices and enriched combatants. The “curse” of lapis lazuli continues to hang over the region: it funds those in power while providing scant benefit to those in need.

On the global stage, the Taliban’s control of lapis has not gone unnoticed. Markets are awash in Afghan lapis, even as some buyers shy away for ethical reasons. International stakeholders face a difficult balance. Curbing the lapis trade could cut off one stream of Taliban financing, but it also risks hurting Afghan miners and driving the trade further underground. Engaging with the Taliban on resource governance, on the other hand, is fraught with political and moral hazards given the regime’s human rights record. For now, the international community has opted for pressure and principled distance – a stance that has constrained but not eliminated the Taliban’s lapis revenues.

Going forward, much depends on how both the Taliban and outside actors proceed. If the Taliban invest in better governance, share profits locally, and seek legitimate trading channels, lapis mining could, in theory, aid Afghanistan’s economic recovery. If instead the mines are stripped for quick cash, the lapis will eventually run low, leaving behind environmental damage and local grievance. Meanwhile, gemstone buyers worldwide must decide whether Afghan lapis is a forbidden conflict gem or a potential driver of post-war livelihoods. The story of Afghanistan’s lapis lazuli is still unfolding, but as of today, it remains a vivid example of how a region’s mineral riches can fuel war and peace – and why oversight of such resources is crucial for the country’s future.

Sources: Lapis lazuli mines in Badakhshan have been a major Taliban revenue source. The Taliban now exercise full control over these mines and their output, after seizing the Kuran-wa-Munjan mining district during the insurgency. Illegal mining and smuggling over the past decade led to a collapse in lapis prices from $500 to $20 per kilogram, devastating local traders. Under Taliban rule, officials claim to have curbed smuggling and increased mineral sales, even establishing a local gem processing center to add value. Nonetheless, observers note that lapis exports continue through clandestine routes into Pakistan. Revenues from lapis now significantly bolster Taliban finances – the UN estimated $464 million from Badakhshan’s gold and lapis in 2020 – highlighting why global watchdogs label lapis a “conflict mineral” and urge stricter oversight. International efforts, including Afghan government crackdowns and calls for conflict-mineral designation, have so far only partly stemmed the flow, as the Taliban continues to capitalize on the lapis trade amid Afghanistan’s isolation.